Bit by Bit: Breaking Down the Ninth Circuit\u27s Frameworks for Jury Misconduct in the Digital Age by Gessin, Jesse
18 NEV, L.J. 709, GESSIN - FINAL 5/30/18  12:11 PM 
 
709 
BIT BY BIT: BREAKING DOWN THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT’S FRAMEWORKS FOR JURY 
MISCONDUCT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Jesse Gessin* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 709 
I.  JURY TAMPERING, PROSAIC MISCONDUCT, AND THE REMMER 
PRESUMPTION IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT BEFORE GODOY ....................... 712 
II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CASES .............. 715 
III.  KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO FRAMEWORKS ...................... 721 
 A. Constitutional Origins ................................................................. 721 
 B. Threshold Inquiry ......................................................................... 724 
 C. Voir Dire of Jurors ....................................................................... 724 
 D. Deference to the Trial Judge ........................................................ 725 
 E. The Reasonable Probability Standard ......................................... 725 
IV.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANSWER TO JURY MISCONDUCT IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE ....................................................................................... 726 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 733 
INTRODUCTION 
Footnotes rarely change decades of jurisprudence.1 However, through 
Footnote Six in Godoy v. Spearman2 the Ninth Circuit subtly penned the first 
tide that may eventually wash away a jury misconduct precedent that has per-
plexed state and federal trial courts in the Ninth Circuit for decades. With Go-
doy, the Ninth Circuit joins two sister circuits,3 thereby creating the fault line 
for an emerging circuit split. 
                                                        
*  Partner, Keller/Anderle LLP, Lecturer in Law at the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law. The author would like to thank Steven W. Kim. 
1  But see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
2  Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 968 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017). 
3  See United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 643–45 (4th Cir. 2012) (broadening the appli-
cation of jury tampering framework to cases involving any “external influences on jurors” 
including information from Wikipedia that is material to the charged crime’s elements); 
United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1182 (11th Cir. 2011) (applying the Remmer 
presumption where jury pulled documents from court’s website and researched information 
about the foreperson’s obligations); see also Matthew Fredrickson, Conformity in Confusion: 
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Until Godoy, there were three categories of jury misconduct in the Ninth 
Circuit.4 The first is jury tampering: “[A]n effort to influence the jury’s verdict 
by threatening or offering inducements to one or more of the jurors.”5 Usually, 
jury tampering involves some sort of extraneous human contact with a juror 
that affects the juror’s state of mind.6 The second is “prosaic” jury impropriety, 
where thejre is an intrusion into the sanctity of the jury, but that intrusion is rel-
atively minor and does not involve the introduction of extrinsic evidence7 to the 
jury.8 These first two categories should be viewed as a range of ex-parte-
                                                                                                                                 
Applying a Common Analysis to Wikipedia-Based Jury Misconduct, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & 
ARTS 19 (2013) (discussing Lawson and the application of the traditional jury tampering 
analysis to the introduction of information from the internet to the jury); Trials, 44 GEO. L.J. 
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 565, 638–46 (2015) (combining the legal analyses for juror contact 
with other people and extrinsic materials). 
4  There are very few Ninth Circuit cases discussing the different categories of jury miscon-
duct. In Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 206 F.3d 900, 907–08 (9th 
Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit noted the difference between ex parte contact (or prosaic), co-
ercion (or jury tampering) and extrinsic evidence cases. Similarly and building on Sea Hawk 
Seafoods, in United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit 
again focused on the difference between ex parte contact cases and extraneous information 
cases. 
5  United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1999). 
6  See, e.g., Tarango v. McDaniel, 837 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2016) (addressing jury mis-
conduct where police officers who were victims, investigators, and witnesses in the case 
tailed a holdout juror on his drive to the courthouse); United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 
634, 639, 645 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that seven to ten IRS agents sitting in first two rows 
behind the prosecution who “glared and stared” at the jurors could be jury tampering where 
jurors informed trial court that the jurors felt intimidated by the IRS); United States v. Hen-
ley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a bribery attempt was jury tampering 
where juror stated he was “extremely extremely scared.”); United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 
1003, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a defendant’s offhanded comment, which jurors in-
terpreted as jokingly suggesting a bribe, was not jury tampering because jurors testified that 
the comment “did not preoccupy them at the time, frighten them, or distract them from fo-
cusing on the evidence.”); United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1331–33 (9th Cir. 
1981) (finding that two calls to juror’s husband involving obscene language and telling juror 
to “stop hassling” defendant was insufficient for a finding of jury tampering where juror in-
formed trial court “that she would not let the calls interfere with her duty as a juror.”). 
7  Throughout this Article, “extrinsic evidence” is used interchangeably with “extraneous 
information” because courts often use these terms synonymously. 
8  See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 729–30 (1993) (presence of alternate jurors 
during jury deliberations); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 116 (1983) (juror’s recollection of 
unrelated crime committed by defendant’s associate); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 212 
(1982) (juror’s application for investigative position at District Attorney’s Office during tri-
al); United States v. Wilson, No. 99-30278, 2000 WL 1028686, at *3 (9th Cir. July 20, 2000) 
(juror asked two deputy Marshals “what their jobs were, and they told him they were there 
‘to make sure no one got lost[,]’ ” which the juror interpreted as general courtroom security); 
United States v. English, 92 F.3d 909, 913–14 (9th Cir. 1996) (elevator encounter between 
juror and victims); United States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 202 (9th Cir. 1991) (juror’s contact 
with friends who encouraged her to convict defendant); United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 
452, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) (contact between juror and main defense witness where juror stated 
that he knows defendant is guilty); United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090, 1091–92 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (court clerk consoled juror after another juror swore at her); United States v. 
Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978) (contact be-
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contact misconduct, where a superficial contact at some point crosses the 
threshold into jury tampering.9 The third category is the introduction of extrin-
sic evidence to the jury.10 The Ninth Circuit has historically analyzed ex parte 
contacts differently from the introduction of extrinsic evidence. 
The difficultly with the pre-Godoy misconduct categories is that categoriz-
ing the misconduct becomes messy when dealing with technological communi-
cations. For example, when there is a seemingly innocuous post from a juror to 
social media (whether it be a general post or a post to a friend or group of 
friends) that communication would most likely be considered prosaic.11 If a 
“Facebook friend” responds to that communication—which is likely prosaic 
misconduct on its own—with some half-baked legal opinion, does the miscon-
duct instantly become extraneous evidence misconduct? Or what happens if ju-
rors “friend” each other on social media and suddenly each of the jurors’ non-
juror friends are able to communicate with the jurors during a trial?12 How is 
that misconduct to be categorized? 
                                                                                                                                 
tween juror and court bailiff); United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(premature discussion among the jurors themselves about the case in violation of court ad-
monition). 
9  See, e.g., Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding jury tamper-
ing where a juror “ ‘kept continuous communication’ with her ‘judge friend’ ‘about the case’ 
‘[d]uring the course of the trial’ and ‘disclose[d] to the jury what he said,’ ” but there was no 
overt threat and it is unclear exactly what information was relayed to the jury). 
10  See, e.g., Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490–91 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), overruled 
on other grounds by Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 390 (9th Cir. 2012) (one juror in-
formed other jurors that defendant was convicted armed robber); United States v. Harber, 53 
F.3d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1995) (case agent’s report containing summary of investigation and 
agent’s opinion that defendants were guilty was present in jury room, despite not having 
been admitted into evidence); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1995) (one juror 
conveyed to other jurors information received out of court about defendant’s violent reputa-
tion); Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 697 (9th Cir. 1990) (police report not admitted into ev-
idence was inadvertently given to jury); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 502–03 (9th Cir. 
1987) (a juror conducted an out-of-court experiment with third party, and another juror made 
use of dictionary definition that differed from court’s instructions); United States v. Caro-
Quintero, 769 F. Supp. 1564, 1568, 1575 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (local newspapers in jury room 
during deliberations). 
11  When there have been content-general posts, such as a juror posting on Facebook about 
having jury duty, United States v. Williams, No. 06-00079, 2014 WL 2893232, at *3–4 (D. 
Haw. June 26, 2014) (“[T]he juror’s posts here give the court absolutely no reason to believe 
that any juror has been exposed to prejudicial or extraneous information, or otherwise violat-
ed the court’s admonitions.”), or even a more detailed “play-by-play” series of posts about a 
trial, United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 306 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the defendant 
could not show “any prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice” from a juror posting on Twit-
ter and Facebook over the course of months about trial), courts have generally refused to la-
bel the conduct as jury tampering. 
12  See Ben Holden, Courts Must Be Prepared for Tech-Savvy Jurors, BALT. SUN (June 23, 
2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-06-23/news/bs-ed-courts-tech-20110623_ 1_ju 
dge-sweeney-jurors-medical-malpractice-trial [https://perma.cc/LQU6-73M9] (five jurors 
friending each other on Facebook). 
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Jurors are curious and connected.13 That is unlikely to change anytime 
soon.14 These blurred lines render inconsistencies in the law, or worse, arbitrary 
distinctions between circumstances simply for the sake of keeping outdated 
frameworks alive. Footnote Six abandons the old, and recreates a framework 
better suited for the digital age. After all, it is within the jury box that technolo-
gy has the greatest risk of disrupting trials. 
Understanding the law before Godoy provides a critical backdrop to realiz-
ing the significance of Footnote Six. This Article begins with a review of the 
two types of ex parte misconduct—jury tampering and prosaic misconduct. 
Part II is a look into the extrinsic evidence framework. The third Part teases out 
the differences between the ex parte and extrinsic evidence frameworks. The 
final Part discusses the Godoy framework and aspects of the previous frame-
works that are likely to be grafted onto the Godoy framework. 
I. JURY TAMPERING, PROSAIC MISCONDUCT, AND THE REMMER 
PRESUMPTION IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT BEFORE GODOY 
In a pair of cases from the 1950s, the Supreme Court established a simple 
framework for addressing jury tampering allegations:15 
In a criminal case, any . . . tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a 
trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed 
presumptively prejudicial. . . . The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden 
rests heavily upon the Government to establish . . . that such contact with the ju-
ror was harmless to the defendant.16 
                                                        
13  See Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1587–88 (2011) (citations 
omitted) (“[A] quick survey of recent cases shows instances where jurors have run Google 
searches on the defendant, the names of co-conspirators, and the defense lawyer. In other 
cases, jurors have discovered that a prosecution witness was in protective custody because of 
the defendant; looked up the Myspace profile of one of the teenage victims in a felony sexual 
abuse case; accessed the Facebook page of a defendant accused of aggravated burglary with 
a weapon, where he showed a picture of himself holding a gun; tried to look up the defend-
ant’s prior criminal record on a police department website; looked up the driving record of a 
truck driver in a negligence action; looked up defendants’ ages and dates of birth; researched 
oppositional defiant disorder; researched alternative causes of death in a manslaughter case; 
researched the effect on blood alcohol of the drug Narcan in a vehicular homicide case; 
looked up a definition of ‘lividity’ and the role it might have had in fixing the time of a beat-
ing victim’s death; researched the injury of retinal detachment in a child-murder case; and 
determined whether a particular type of firearm could have damaged a bullet-proof vest.”). 
14  Daniel William Bell, Note, Juror Misconduct and the Internet, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 81, 83 
(2010) (citations omitted) (“Jurors’ independent research is not a new problem. The Internet 
aside, jurors have looked up ambiguous terms in dictionaries, conducted substantive legal 
research, engaged in at-home experiments, visited accident scenes, and otherwise obtained 
specialized knowledge. The number of such incidents, however, seems to have dramatically 
increased since the advent of the Internet.”). 
15  See generally Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (Remmer I); Remmer v. 
United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (Remmer II). 
16  Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229 (citing Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148–50 (1892)). 
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When originally conceived, the “Remmer presumption” (as the presump-
tion has come to be known) was a “categorical directive” to lower courts to ap-
ply one approach to instances of jury tampering.17 However, later Supreme 
Court decisions have muddied the waters.18 Consequently, the federal circuit 
courts currently apply three different tests to juror tampering allegations: “(1) 
applying the Remmer presumption, (2) abandoning the Remmer presumption, 
and (3) determining whether or not to apply the Remmer presumption based on 
the severity of the contact.”19 The Ninth Circuit follows the third approach.20 
The Ninth Circuit’s severity-of-contact approach centers on the difference 
between “prosaic kinds of jury misconduct” and the “much more serious intru-
sion” of jury tampering.21 Importantly, prosaic misconduct cases require the de-
fendant to show actual prejudice, while jury tampering is presumed to be preju-
dicial, thereby shifting the burden to the government to rebut the presumption.22 
Until Godoy, the analytical framework underlying the presumption applied to 
all cases involving ex parte contacts, but only jury tampering triggered the pre-
sumption.23 
There are two steps in the pre-Godoy framework. First, the defendant must 
make a prima facie showing that the intrusion into the jurors’ deliberations 
                                                        
17  See United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1999). 
18  See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993) (reversing the Ninth Cir-
cuit by finding that presence of alternate jurors during deliberations is not inherently prejudi-
cial); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 115, 116–21 (1983) (tersely worded per curiam deci-
sion vacating the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the ex parte communication between trial 
judge and juror at issue was not harmless error); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) 
(stating that “allegations of juror partiality” should be addressed through a Remmer hearing 
where “the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”). 
19  Fredrickson, supra note 3, at 24. But see Anna H. Tison, United States v. Lawson: Prob-
lems with Presumption in the Fourth Circuit, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2244, 2251–54 (2013) (dis-
cussing different approaches taken by federal circuit courts); Eva Kerr, Note, Prejudice, 
Procedure, and a Proper Presumption: Restoring the Remmer Presumption of Prejudice in 
Order to Protect Criminal Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1451, 
1463–78 (2008) (opining that there is a “spectrum” of six differing approaches to the Rem-
mer presumption). 
20  See Dutkel, 192 F.3d at 896 (“Having concluded that the Remmer presumption applies if 
the case involves jury tampering, we must still decide whether what occurred here amounted 
to tampering.”). 
21  Id. at 895; see also United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 643 (9th Cir. 2004). 
22  Compare United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1988) (where there is an 
ex parte contact short of jury tampering and not involving the “unauthorized submission of 
‘extraneous information’ (e.g., a file or dictionary) to the jury,” “a defendant must demon-
strate ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from an ex parte contact to receive a new trial.”), with Dut-
kel, 192 F.3d at 895 (limiting Madrid to a “prosaic kind[] of . . . misconduct” and requiring 
presumption of prejudice in jury tampering case). While there has been at least one Ninth 
Circuit case where conduct short of jury tampering required the Remmer presumption, this 
case was decided before Olano and the government rebutted the presumption of prejudice to 
the defendant. See United States v. Goliday, 468 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1972) (government 
rebutted presumption where juror discussed a hypothetical with her son). 
23  See Kerr, supra note 19, at 1476. 
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could have “interfered with the jury’s exercise of its functions,” thereby requir-
ing a hearing.24 In determining whether a hearing should be held, the trial court 
must consider: (1) “the content of the allegations,” (2) “the seriousness of the 
alleged misconduct or bias,” and (3) “the credibility of the source.”25 
The “appropriate inquiry” into the misconduct should not focus on the in-
tent behind the misconduct, but “whether the unauthorized conduct raises a risk 
of influencing the verdict or had an adverse effect on the deliberations.”26 “The 
‘adverse effect’ standard is a low one: ‘Unless the district court finds that this 
showing is entirely frivolous or wholly implausible, it must order a Remmer 
hearing to explore the degree of the intrusion and likely prejudice suffered by 
the defendant.’ ”27 Similarly, even in cases involving prosaic misconduct, “the 
district court, upon finding a reasonable possibility of prejudice, must hold a 
fair hearing.”28 Accordingly, once a defendant makes a threshold showing of 
misconduct, the trial court must sua sponte hold an evidentiary hearing,29 and a 
“specific request for a hearing” from the defendant is not necessary.30 There-
fore, most of the Ninth Circuit cases where a hearing was found to be unneces-
sary involved extraneous information.31 
Once a defendant makes a prima facie showing of intrusion and a hearing 
is ordered, the court must obtain information from the jurors to determine the 
exact nature of the contact. During the hearing, the “[trial] court may not, under 
[Federal Rule of Evidence] 606(b), consider testimony regarding the affected 
juror’s mental processes in reaching the verdict.”32 “However, a court can and 
should consider the effect of . . . improper contacts on a juror’s state of mind, a 
juror’s general fear and anxiety following such an incident, and any other 
thoughts a juror might have about the contacts or conduct at issue.”33 
                                                        
24  Dutkel, 192 F.3d at 898. 
25  United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brande, 329 
F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2003). 
26  Rutherford, 371 F.3d at 644 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27  United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001). 
28  United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Brande, 329 F.3d 
at 1178 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing where a court staff approached a juror and 
asked him whether he would be unable to find a defendant guilty of a crime). But see United 
States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 2005) (no abuse of discretion despite fail-
ure to conduct hearing though juror contacted prosecution witness because the court under-
stood nature and scope of bias allegation). 
29  Angulo, 4 F.3d at 848. 
30  United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1999). 
31  While an evidentiary hearing is not mandated every time there is an allegation of jury 
misconduct or bias, cases where a trial court’s decision not to hold a hearing has been upheld 
involve extrinsic evidence, Smith, 424 F.3d at 1011–12; United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 
935 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1983), and not ex parte contacts. 
32  United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
33  Id.; see also United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Similarly, the Fourth Circuit, in a well-reasoned 
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If the court finds that the contact rises to the level of jury tampering, i.e., 
the ex parte contact had an adverse effect on any juror, then the Remmer pre-
sumption requires the government to show that there is “no reasonable possibil-
ity that [any juror] was affected in his freedom of action as a juror as to [the de-
fendant].”34 Even where the contact may not rise to the level of jury tampering, 
if the contact was initiated by a witness or an interested party, then the Remmer 
presumption applies.35 Most importantly, the standard for rebutting the pre-
sumption places “the focus on the jury’s deliberative process rather than on its 
verdict.”36 Accordingly, the weight of the evidence at trial is not an important 
factor in rebutting the presumption. Where the government cannot carry its 
burden, the conviction must be vacated or a mistrial declared.37 However, 
where the contact falls short of jury tampering—and should therefore be cate-
gorized as a prosaic contact—the defendant must show that the contact actually 
prejudiced him or her.38 At least that was the requirement prior to Godoy. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CASES 
In the digital age, jury misconduct is more likely to come in the form of ex-
trinsic evidence that is posted to or obtained from the internet rather than 
through direct human contact.39 When extraneous information is produced by 
the jury, such as a juror posting on a social media website, the misconduct is 
more likely to be categorized as a prosaic impropriety.40 Conversely, when the 
                                                                                                                                 
opinion that more squarely confronts the interplay between the Remmer presumption and 
Rule 606(b), has distinguished between testimony regarding the affected juror’s mental pro-
cesses in reaching the verdict—which is barred by Rule 606(b)—and testimony regarding 
the juror’s more general fear and anxiety following a tampering incident, which is admissible 
for purposes of determining whether there is a reasonable possibility that the extraneous con-
tact affected the verdict.”). 
34  Dutkel, 192 F.3d at 899. 
35  Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men’s Colony, 365 F.3d 691, 696–98 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation 
omitted) (stating in a case where a detective who provided crucial testimony had a twenty-
minute conversation, factually unrelated to the trial, with three jurors during a recess, “[w]e 
and other circuits have held that Mattox established a bright-line rule: Any unauthorized 
communication between a juror and a witness or interested party is presumptively prejudi-
cial.”). 
36  Henley, 238 F.3d at 1118. 
37  Id. at 1117. 
38  United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 949 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Ma-
drid, 842 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
39  See Amy J. St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, Ensuring an Impartial Jury in the Age of 
Social Media, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 2 (2012) (“The explosive growth of social [me-
dia] has placed enormous pressure on one of the most fundamental of American institu-
tions—the impartial jury.”). 
40  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 06-00079, 2014 WL 2893232, at *3–4 (D. Haw. 
June 26, 2014) (juror posting on Facebook that juror had jury duty gives “the court absolute-
ly no reason to believe that any juror has been exposed to prejudicial or extraneous infor-
mation, or otherwise violated the court’s admonitions.”). 
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extraneous information is introduced to the jury, Ninth Circuit jurisprudence 
requires a legal framework that is wholly distinct from the Remmer framework. 
There has been understandable confusion concerning when to apply the 
different Ninth Circuit frameworks. Early Ninth Circuit jurisprudence cited and 
relied on Remmer when addressing extraneous information misconduct,41 and 
the Ninth Circuit has applied Remmer to an extrinsic evidence case as recently 
as 2012.42 Early and outlying Ninth Circuit cases aside, for many decades, until 
Godoy, there has been an unmistakable divergence between the legal frame-
works applied to ex parte contact cases and extrinsic evidence cases. 
In the Ninth Circuit, when a court is informed that a juror or jurors are ex-
posed to extrinsic evidence, the first step for a trial court is to determine wheth-
er to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate the nature and scope of the ju-
ry’s exposure to extrinsic evidence.43 Extraneous evidence is defined as 
information that enters “the jury room through an external, prohibited route,” 
and therefore is not “part of the trial.”44 Information derived from a juror’s in-
trinsic human experience is not considered extraneous evidence.45 While at one 
point an evidentiary hearing was mandated “upon learning of a possible inci-
dent of juror misconduct,”46 and “although it is usually preferable to hold an 
                                                        
41  United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the con-
tinued vitality of Remmer in a case involving extraneous information); United States v. 
Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 883–86 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (citing Remmer I in a case 
where a juror researched extrinsic material from a library). Confusingly, while not expressly 
applying Remmer, another Ninth Circuit decision in an “improper influence” case involving 
a conversation between a juror and the juror’s attorney-friend states that a new trial is war-
ranted in that case because “[n]ot only is there a ‘reasonable possibility of prejudice,’ but the 
government has not succeeded in rebutting the presumption that a new trial is warranted.” 
Rosenthal, 454 F.3d at 950. 
42  Tong Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1075–78 (9th Cir. 2012). 
43  United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The threshold ques-
tion . . . is a factual one: whether the jury obtained or used evidence that was not introduced 
at the trial.”); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that “where a trial court learns of a possible 
incident of jury misconduct, it is preferable to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the 
precise nature of the extraneous information, not every allegation that extraneous infor-
mation has reached the jury requires a full-dress hearing.”). 
44  United States v. Bussell, 414 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). In Bussell, a supplemental jury instruction about the absence of a 
co-defendant who had died gave rise to jury speculation about the reason for his absence. Id. 
at 1053. The speculation was not considered extraneous information. Id. at 1055. In United 
States v. Gomez-Gomez, No. 93-10150, 1994 WL 168255, at *3 (9th Cir. May 4, 1994), the 
Ninth Circuit held that the jury’s use of a magnifying glass to look at fingerprints “is clearly 
not extrinsic evidence.” 
45  Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 779 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(inquiry “requires a reviewing court to determine whether the particular materials that a juror 
brought into the jury room are extraneous materials, or are merely the kind of common 
knowledge which most jurors are presumed to possess.”). 
46  Bagnariol, 665 F.2d at 885. 
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evidentiary hearing,”47 the trial court ultimately has discretion to decide wheth-
er to grant a hearing.48 Similar to ex parte contact/coercion cases, trial courts 
must consider: (1) “the content of the allegations,” (2) “the seriousness of the 
alleged misconduct or bias,” and (3) “the credibility of the source”49 in making 
this determination. A hearing is not necessary where the court “knows the exact 
scope and nature of the extraneous information,”50 finds the information to be 
completely without credibility,51 or finds the information to be de minimis.52 
Once the court decides to hold an evidentiary hearing, the next step is to 
answer the threshold question of whether the jury “used evidence that was not 
introduced at the trial.”53 If there is no proof that any juror used the extraneous 
                                                        
47  United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (alteration omitted); United States v. McChesney, 613 F. App’x. 556, 
560 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted) (re-
versing decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing where defendant submitted an “affidavit 
from a woman who asserted that, as she was leaving the courthouse and turning in her badge 
. . . she heard the ex-girlfriend state in a loud manner in front of at least three jurors in the 
lobby that McChesney had a criminal past and that he would do anything he had to do for 
money.”). 
48  United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1983). 
49  United States v. Montes, 628 F.3d 1183, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
50  Saya, 247 F.3d at 934–35 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration 
omitted); United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[N]ot every alle-
gation that extraneous information has reached the jury requires a full-dress hearing.”); Hal-
bert, 712 F.2d at 389 (“Although it is usually preferable to hold such a hearing, in this in-
stance, the court knew the exact scope and nature of the newspaper article and the extraneous 
information.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Grullon, 545 F.3d 93, 97–98 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(no evidentiary hearing necessary after joke printed from website disparaging lawyers was 
found in jury room). 
51  United States v. Gomez-Gomez, No. 93-10150, 1994 WL 168255, at *3 (9th Cir. May 4, 
1994) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“If the court is able to determine 
without a hearing that the allegations are without credibility or that the allegations if true 
would not warrant a new trial, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary.”); United States v. 
Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991) (“An evidentiary hearing must be granted 
unless the alleged misconduct could not have affected the verdict or the district court can 
determine from the record before it that the allegations are without credibility.”). 
52  United States v. Christensen, 624 F. App’x 466, 483 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[A] single comment 
overheard in leaving the courtroom or a passing mention of a website report containing in-
formation the jurors can observe themselves in open court, does not persuade us that the de-
cision not to hold an evidentiary hearing was reversible error.”). While the Ninth Circuit has 
not precisely defined de minimis information, “[a] communication is . . . not de minimis, if it 
raises a risk of influencing the verdict.” Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men’s Colony, 365 F.3d 
691, 697 (9th Cir. 2004). 
53  United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The threshold ques-
tion we must address, then, is a factual one: whether the jury obtained or used evidence that 
was not introduced at the trial. If, as the deliberating jurors all testified, none of them even 
saw the paper with the alternative jury instructions on it, it is logically impossible that this 
extrinsic evidence affected their verdict.”); United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1025 n.12 
(9th Cir. 1998) (“At the risk of belaboring the obvious, we pause to emphasize that when a 
defendant challenges a juror’s reception of extrinsic information, he must, as a threshold 
matter, make a showing that the juror actually received—i.e., either saw or heard—the in-
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material, then the inquiry ends.54 During questioning, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 606(b): 
[A] juror may testify as to “whether extraneous prejudicial information was im-
properly brought to the jury’s attention,” but not as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of any-
thing upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to 
assent to or dissent from the verdict . . . or concerning the juror’s mental pro-
cesses in connection therewith.55 
If the court finds that extraneous information has reached any juror, “the 
inquiry must then focus on whether there is a reasonable possibility that the ex-
traneous information could have affected the verdict.”56 “This inquiry is an ob-
jective one: [the court] need not ascertain whether the extraneous information 
actually influenced any specific juror.”57 This is the third step in the framework. 
The crux of the “reasonable possibility” standard in this framework is the 
government’s burden of persuasion. In place of a presumption of prejudice to 
the defendant, “[t]he government has the burden of showing beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that extrinsic evidence did not contribute to the verdict.”58 Based on  
                                                                                                                                 
formation.”), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169 
n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). 
54  Plunk, 153 F.3d at 1025 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Because 
none of the jurors in the instant case ever actually viewed the definition of the word organiz-
er, the extrinsic evidence . . . was never actually considered, or obtained or used by the jury. 
Consequently, by definition, there could be no reasonable possibility that the evidence af-
fected the jury’s deliberations.”). But see Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 
1988) (“In Vasquez, . . . [w]e held that the possibility that at least one juror had been exposed 
to some of the more prejudicial information in [a court file], such as evidence that the appel-
lant had been previously prosecuted for a similar offense, was too great for the court to con-
clude that the verdict had not been affected by the extraneous information.”); United States 
v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1979) (although no jurors remembered reading 
about the defendant’s prior conviction, because “[t]he possibilities are too great that at least 
one juror realized that the [defendant] had been previously prosecuted,” other jurors discov-
ered the defendant was denied a motion to dismiss and one juror discovered that the court 
had refused defendant’s proposed jury instructions, the defendant was granted a new trial). 
Later Ninth Circuit cases have backed away from Vasquez and Dickson on this point, there-
fore outside of extrinsic evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction, unless the information 
actually reaches a juror, the inquiry should end. 
55  United States v. Montes, 628 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted) (citation 
omitted); Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Therefore, although [the 
court] may consider testimony concerning whether the improper evidence was considered, 
we may not consider the jurors’ testimony about the subjective impact of the improperly ad-
mitted evidence.”). 
56  Montes, 628 F.3d at 1187 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); United 
States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“The fact that at least one juror . . . received extrinsic evidence is sufficient 
to trigger the reasonable possibility standard of Dickson and Vasquez.”). 
57  Montes, 628 F.3d at 1187 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58  Keating, 147 F.3d at 902 (citation omitted). 
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Dickson v. Sullivan,59 and Jeffries v. Wood,60 there are multiple factors that the 
court must consider when determining whether the government has met this 
burden.61 Courts must consider: (1) “whether the prejudicial statement was am-
biguously phrased”; (2) “whether the extraneous information was otherwise 
admissible or merely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial”; (3) 
“whether a curative instruction was given or some other step taken to amelio-
rate the prejudice”; (4) “the trial context”; and (5) “whether the statement was 
insufficiently prejudicial given the issues and evidence in the case.”62 When 
considering the “trial context,” courts must take into account: 
[W]hether the material was actually received, and if so, how; the length of time 
it was available to the jury; the extent to which the juror discussed and consid-
ered it; [and] whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, 
and if so at what point in the deliberations.63 
Courts may also consider “any other matters which may bear on the issue 
of the reasonable possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the ver-
dict.”64 After applying the factors to the totality of the circumstances, a mistrial 
or new trial must be declared where there is a reasonable “possibility that the 
extrinsic material could have affected the verdict.”65 
While no single factor is dispositive,66 the focus of the inquiry is on the na-
ture and materiality of the extraneous information in relation to the key issues 
in the case,67and not the source of the information.68 For this reason, extraneous 
information that has led to new trials includes the following: prior convictions  
 
 
                                                        
59  Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406. 
60  Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1491–92 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by 
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). 
61  Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1491–92; Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406. 
62  Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1491–92 (citation omitted). 
63  Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406 (citation omitted) (internal numbering omitted). 
64  Id. (internal numbering omitted). 
65  United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 885 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). 
66  Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406. 
67  United States v. Montes, 628 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“Our cases have stressed the nature of the extraneous information when determin-
ing the possibility that the information affected the verdict.”); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 
612 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (“When assessing prejudice claims in juror misconduct 
cases, this court also places great weight on the nature of the extrinsic evidence intro-
duced.”); Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406–07 (stressing the importance of the nature of the extra-
neous information). 
68  Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding “no defensible distinction 
to be made based solely on the source of the information,” and stating that the “appropriate 
focus should be on the nature of the information itself.”). 
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of the defendant;69 new criminal activity by the defendant against a witness;70 
medical, dictionary, or encyclopedia definitions that are materially contrary to 
the jury instructions;71 a cover magazine article describing the very scheme 
charged as a growing national concern and deploring the light sentences fre-
quently associated with the schemes;72 information about a phone call taking 
credit for killing the victim that directly relates to motive;73 information from 
an attorney-friend of a juror about the law of the case;74 a juror’s experiment 
testing whether she could fire a gun in a particular position,75 and jurors hearing 
that the defendant “was very violent” and “had a violent temper” in a violent 
crime case.76 
In contrast, extraneous information that has not led to a new trial includes 
the following: information that the government’s witnesses did not receive im-
munity;77 information that a fictional company created by the government was 
not listed in business publications;78 immaterial or non-contrary dictionary def-
initions;79 a prior incident where the defendant and his girlfriend were victims 
of a shooting;80 in a marijuana possession case, an opinion by a juror who wit-
nessed the defendant around the time of the crime that he looked like a fat old 
hippie who probably smoked marijuana;81 jurors seeing a key defense witnesses 
look and speak in a “clear and coherent manner,” which was contrary to his in-
court testimony;82 potential juror’s remark that the defendant pleaded guilty at 
one time but then withdrew the guilty plea;83 disclosure by one juror to several 
other members of the jury that the juror had just discovered that the defense’s 
expert witness had misdiagnosed his wife with cancer and performed an unnec-
                                                        
69  United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895, 903–04 (9th Cir. 1998); Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 
1484, 1488; United States v. Vasquez, 597 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1979). But see United 
States v. Mills, 280 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2002) (no reasonable probability of affecting the 
verdict where prior conviction of defendant cumulative of information already produced and 
speculative as to whether the information reached the jury). 
70  United States v. Rasmussen, No. 99-30008, 1999 WL 1206842, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 15, 
1999). 
71  Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1980); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 
505–06 (9th Cir. 1987). 
72  United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429, 1430 (9th. Cir. 1985). 
73  Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000). 
74  United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2006). 
75  Marino, 812 F.2d at 503. 
76  Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1995). 
77  United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1981). 
78  United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
79  United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 744–45 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Steele,785 
F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986). 
80  United States v. Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2001). 
81  United States v. Mills, 280 F.3d 915, 916 (9th Cir. 2002). 
82  Tong Xiong v. Felker, 681 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012). 
83  Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 519 U.S. 889 (1996). 
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essary hysterectomy;84 and jurors seeing a defendant emerge from the office of 
a parole officer who had testified at trial, thereby leading to the inference that 
defendant was under supervision.85 
III. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO FRAMEWORKS 
A. Constitutional Origins 
Based on the difference in their constitutional origins, tampering and ex-
traneous information cases come from two distinct jurisprudential lines. What 
has at times confused scholars and courts is that these lines intersected in Rem-
mer I.86 Long before Remmer I was decided, the Supreme Court took up the is-
sue of the introduction of extraneous information to the jury. In Mattox v. Unit-
ed States, a bailiff relayed extraneous information to the jury about the 
defendant killing other victims not discussed in the court proceedings.87 Al-
though no prejudice was shown, the Supreme Court presumed prejudice and 
reversed the conviction.88 Remmer I relied heavily on Mattox in crafting the 
presumption of prejudice, but not in applying the presumption.89 The Remmer I 
and Mattox decisions were squarely based on the right to an impartial jury.90 
Less than ten years after Remmer I and II, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in a case involving extraneous information and ex parte contacts. In 
Turner v. Louisiana, a sequestered jury was continually in the presence of dep-
uty sheriffs, two of whom had testified at trial about the defendant’s confession 
to murder.91 While there was no actual showing of extraneous information con-
cerning the trial being produced to the jurors by the deputies, the deputies none-
theless conversed with the jurors, ate with jurors, did errands for them, and 
                                                        
84  United States v. Namihas, No. 96-50615, 1997 WL 801450, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 
1997). 
85  United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1986). 
86  The Supreme Court created the legal presumption in Remmer v. United States (Remmer I), 
347 U.S. 227, 229–30 (1954) and remanded to the lower courts for a hearing and application 
of the presumption. After a hearing in the trial court, the case ended up back in the Supreme 
Court where the Court held that the hearing was too limited in scope and remanded for a new 
trial. Remmer v. United States (Remmer II), 350 U.S. 377, 382 (1956). 
87  Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 151 (1892). 
88  Id. Similarly, the next year in Bates v. Preble, 151 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1893), the Supreme 
Court held it to be reversible error where the trial judge allowed an entire book to go into the 
jury room without sealing off the pages not admitted into evidence, even though it was not 
shown that any of the jurors had actually read the inadmissible pages. 
89  Compare Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229 (citing Mattox, 146 U.S. 140, for the proposition that 
the “presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to es-
tablish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was 
harmless to the defendant.”), with Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 381 (not citing Mattox, 146 U.S. 
140, when applying the presumption to the facts). 
90  Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149–50; Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 382. 
91  Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 467–68 (1965). 
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drove them to restaurants for meals and to their lodgings each night.92 After be-
ing convicted and sentenced to death, Turner challenged his conviction to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, where he lost, on the ground that the conduct of the 
trial had violated the Fourteenth Amendment.93 Turner’s claim recited in detail 
the deputies’ “fraternization with the jurors throughout the trial” and argued 
that the presence of the state’s witnesses with the jury, “whether they be depu-
ties or not,” was “prejudicial to the constitutional rights of Defendant and viola-
tive of due process of law.”94 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in 
light of “the extreme prejudice inherent in this continual association,” and, 
while the Court initially framed the constitutional underpinning of the decision 
within the contours of the right to an impartial jury, the reasoning unequivocal-
ly revolved around the right of confrontation.95 
A year later, in Parker v. Gladden, the Supreme Court again addressed the 
issue of extraneous information being delivered to a jury.96 In Parker, the de-
fendant was tried and convicted for second degree murder.97 After Parker’s di-
rect appeals were denied, his wife was able to get tape recordings from jurors 
about a bailiff who remarked to a juror that the defendant was guilty and that if 
there was an error in finding the defendant guilty, the Supreme Court would 
correct it.98 Based on these tape recordings, Parker filed a post-conviction peti-
tion in the trial court and the trial court held that the comments were “prejudi-
cial” and “materially affected” Parker’s rights.99 The Supreme Court of Oregon 
reversed finding that “the bailiff’s misconduct did not deprive [Parker] of a 
constitutionally correct trial.”100 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 
with the bulk of its reasoning relying and expanding on the confrontation lan-
guage from Turner.101 
Of note, neither of the Remmer cases nor Mattox are mentioned in Turner 
or Parker. More importantly, the constitutional fulcrum for extraneous infor-
mation cases derives not from the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, 
but from the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. This titanic constitution-
                                                        
92  Id. at 468. 
93  Id. at 471. 
94  Id. at 471 n.7. 
95  Id. at 472–73. (“In the constitutional sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily im-
plies at the very least that the ‘evidence developed’ against a defendant shall come from the 
witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s 
right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.”). 
96  Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 363–64 (1966). 
97  Id. at 363. 
98  Id. at 363–64. 
99  Id. at 364. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. at 364–65 (citation omitted) (“We have followed the ‘undeviating rule,’ that the rights 
of confrontation and cross-examination are among the fundamental requirements of a consti-
tutionally fair trial.”). 
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al difference is well settled in Ninth Circuit jurisprudence102 and represents a 
key distinction between jury tampering/prosaic misconduct cases and extrane-
ous information cases.103 Indeed, the reasoning of extraneous information cases 
often focuses on confrontation.104 
                                                        
102 Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 779 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The core principle is well-settled: 
evidence developed against a defendant must come from the witness stand.”); Sassounian v. 
Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A juror’s communication of extrinsic facts im-
plicates the Confrontation Clause.”). 
103  Compare United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Because jury tam-
pering cuts to the heart of the Sixth Amendment’s promise of a fair trial, we treat jury tam-
pering cases very differently from other cases of jury misconduct.”), with Gibson v. Clanon, 
633 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[D]ecisions have noted that when a jury considers facts 
that have not been introduced in evidence, a defendant has effectively lost the rights of con-
frontation, cross-examination, and the assistance of counsel with regard to jury consideration 
of the extraneous evidence. In one sense the violation may be more serious than where these 
rights are denied at some other stage of the proceedings because the defendant may have no 
idea what new evidence has been considered. It is impossible to offer evidence to rebut it, to 
offer a curative instruction, to discuss its significance in argument to the jury, or to take other 
tactical steps that might ameliorate its impact.”), and United States v. Keating, 147 F.3d 895, 
900 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that the 
standard for extrinsic evidence cases is “well-established” and “derives from one of the most 
fundamental tenets of our justice system: that a defendant’s conviction may be based only on 
the evidence presented during the trial.”). 
104  See, e.g., Keating, 147 F.3d at 899–900 (alteration omitted) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[J]uror exposure to extrinsic evidence during trial implicates 
wholly different concerns than those at issue in pretrial knowledge cases.” Thus “[e]ven if 
the defendants tacitly approved jurors with pretrial knowledge, they did not waive their Sixth 
Amendment rights to confront those who testify against them and to conduct cross-
examination.”); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citation 
omitted) (stating that the source of extraneous information was irrelevant because “[w]hen a 
juror communicates objective extrinsic facts regarding the defendant or the alleged crimes to 
other jurors, the juror becomes an unsworn witness within the meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause. That the unsworn testimony comes from a juror rather than a court official does not 
diminish the scope of a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment.”); Dickson v. Sulli-
van, 849 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the jury instruction was insufficient 
to rebut prejudice stemming from extraneous information where “the defendant was de-
prived of the opportunity to rebut the evidence.”); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 506 
(9th Cir. 1987) (“Nor do we find merit in the State’s argument that the out-of-court experi-
ment could not have prejudiced the petitioner as any conclusions drawn from that experi-
ment could not have differed materially from conclusions drawn from the authorized exper-
iment performed in the jury room at the behest of the parties and the court. The State’s 
argument ignores the participation in the out-of-court experiment of a nonjuror, whom the 
defense could neither confront nor cross-examine.”); United States v. Bagley, 641 F.2d 
1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted) (“The dangers generally posed by consideration 
of extrajudicial information, which the Gibson court emphasized, are not present here. First, 
it was noted that because a defendant has no idea what information the jury may have con-
sidered, he has no opportunity to offer evidence in rebuttal or to discuss its significance in 
argument to the jury. In this case the defendant knew precisely what evidence the jury had 
considered before it rendered its verdict, for his trial counsel had concurred in presenting the 
information to the jury.”). 
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What will be intriguing in cases after Godoy is whether the testimonial na-
ture of any outside contact will become an established factor in determining 
whether the Remmer presumption is triggered.105 
B. Threshold Inquiry 
Before Godoy, in both contact and extrinsic evidence cases, to determine 
whether a hearing should be held, courts had to consider “the content of the al-
legations, the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility 
of the source.”106 However, the threshold inquiry differs between the two cate-
gories of misconduct. In extraneous information cases, the threshold question is 
whether the jury “used evidence that was not introduced at the trial.”107 If the 
evidence was not processed by any members of the jury, then the inquiry is 
over.108 In contrast, where an ex parte contact is brought to the court’s atten-
tion, the threshold inquiry is whether the contact could have affected a juror or 
jurors’ mental state.109 The burden is squarely on the defendant to make this 
prima facie showing.110 There is no such prima facie showing requirement with 
extrinsic evidence cases. If the contact is de minimis—meaning that the contact 
could have little to no effect on a juror’s mental state—then the defendant can-
not make the requisite showing and the inquiry is over.111 
C. Voir Dire of Jurors 
The voir dire of jurors—the process by which the court questions the jury 
about the contact—is distinct between the frameworks. Where ex parte contacts 
are implicated, the inquiry centers on the effect of the contact on a juror or ju-
                                                        
105  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (Sixth Amendment forbids admis-
sion of testimonial evidence without an opportunity for the defendant to confront the wit-
ness). 
106  United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Mon-
tes, 628 F.3d 1183, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Brande, 329 F.3d 1173, 1176–
77 (9th Cir. 2003). 
107  United States v. Lopez-Martinez, 543 F.3d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The threshold 
question we must address, then, is a factual one: whether the jury obtained or used evidence 
that was not introduced at the trial. If, as the deliberating jurors all testified, none of them 
even saw the paper with the alternative jury instructions on it, it is logically impossible that 
this extrinsic evidence affected their verdict.”). 
108  Id. at 519. 
109  United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The first question the dis-
trict court should have resolved is whether Dutkel made a prima facie showing that Ellis and 
Mumphrey’s interactions with Johnson could have interfered with the jury’s exercise of its 
functions vis-a-vis Dutkel.”). 
110  Id. at 897. 
111  Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men’s Colony, 365 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Given 
this reality, if an unauthorized communication with a juror is de minimis, the defendant must 
show that the communication could have influenced the verdict before the burden of proof 
shifts to the prosecution.”). 
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rors’ mental state.112 The objective nature of the contact is less important than 
how the contact subjectively affects the jury.113 On the other hand, in extrinsic 
evidence cases, the voir dire should focus on ascertaining the nature of the in-
formation to determine the information’s materiality in light of the circum-
stances of the case.114 Thus, “[a] trial judge should not investigate the subjec-
tive effects of any extrinsic evidence upon the jurors.”115 
D. Deference to the Trial Judge 
In extrinsic evidence cases, the Ninth Circuit has described the deference 
owed to a trial judge’s impression about the impact of the extraneous evidence 
as a “special deference,”116 which “deserves substantial weight.”117 Where ex 
parte contacts are involved, however, the Ninth Circuit has been less vocal 
about the discretion afforded a trial court.118 
E. The Reasonable Probability Standard 
At the core of both ex parte contact and extrinsic evidence misconduct cas-
es is the reasonable probability standard. However, the standard operates very 
differently in each framework. With contact cases, due to the presumption of 
prejudice, the government must convince the court of a negative, that “there is 
no reasonable possibility that the deliberations . . . were affected by the tamper-
ing.”119 Importantly, the weight of the evidence is not a factor for considera-
tion.120 Conversely, in extraneous information cases, “if there is a reasonable 
possibility that the extrinsic material could have affected the verdict,” then a 
                                                        
112  Dutkel, 192 F.3d at 899. 
113  Id. at 897. 
114  Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1980) (presenting as a key part of the in-
quiry a “review [of] the record to determine the effect, if any, of the extrinsic evidence con-
sidered by the jury.”); see also Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 506 (9th Cir. 1987) (cita-
tion omitted) (stating that “reversible error commonly occurs where there is a direct and 
rational connection between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion, and 
where the misconduct relates directly to a material aspect of the case.”). 
115  Dickson v. Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (alteration omitted). 
116  United States v. Mills, 280 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2002). 
117  Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405. 
118  United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[a] court has 
‘considerable discretion’ in determining” the nature of the ex parte contact, but not mention-
ing deference to the trial court’s conclusions); United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 
1332 (9th Cir. 1981) (describing the deference as “some deference.”). 
119  United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A Remmer hearing must 
begin with a strong presumption that the jury tampering affected the jury’s decision-making 
as to Dutkel. The ‘burden rests heavily upon the Government’ to prove otherwise.”). 
120  Id. (“In order to grant relief, the court need not conclude that the verdict as to Dutkel 
would have been different but for the jury tampering, but rather that the course of delibera-
tions was materially affected by the intrusion.”). 
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new trial is warranted.121 Accordingly, the defendant must convince the court of 
a positive, namely that there could have been an effect on the verdict. The pros-
ecution then has the opportunity to show harmlessness beyond a reasonable 
doubt through application of the Dickson/Jeffries factors.122 Herein lies the 
government’s burden of persuasion. 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANSWER TO JURY MISCONDUCT IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 
Enrique Anthony Godoy was tried and convicted for second degree mur-
der.123 After conviction, an alternate juror signed a declaration attesting: 
During the course of the trial, juror number ten kept continuous communication 
with a gentleman up north, who she referred to as her “judge friend.” Juror 
number ten explained to us, the jury as a whole, that she had a friend that was a 
judge up north. From the time of jury selection until the time of verdict, juror 
number ten would communicate with her “judge friend” about the case via her 
T-Mobile Blackberry, a two way text paging system. When the jury was not sure 
what was going on or what procedurally would happen next, juror number ten 
would communicate with her friend and disclose to the jury what he said.124 
Godoy moved for a new trial based on jury misconduct.125 The trial court 
refused to order an evidentiary hearing to investigate the allegation and denied 
Godoy’s motion.126 The California Court of Appeal affirmed “and the Califor-
nia Supreme Court summarily denied review.”127 Godoy filed a federal habeas 
petition, which the district court denied and a divided three-judge Ninth Circuit 
panel affirmed.128 The Ninth Circuit then heard the case en banc and re-
versed.129 
The mystery in Godoy is in what the “judge friend” said and how much of 
that information was relayed to the jury. The Godoy court impliedly categorizes 
the conduct as an ex parte contact.130 Most intriguing about the misconduct in 
Godoy is that the suspect action could have been classified as extraneous in-
formation because the judge friend was imparting information to the juror. 
However, it is unclear from the record exactly what information was given by 
the judge friend and how much of that information was relayed to the rest of 
                                                        
121  Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122  United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985). 
123  Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
124  Id. at 965. 
125  Id. at 960. 
126  Id. at 961. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. at 960–62. 
130  Id. at 959 (emphasis added) (“when faced with allegations of improper contact between a 
juror and an outside party, courts apply a settled two-step framework.”). 
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the jury. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did not toil in categorizing the miscon-
duct. 
The decision reaffirmed in no uncertain terms the two-step ex parte contact 
framework with the right to an impartial jury as the constitutional underpin-
ning.131 Godoy is silent about the right to confrontation. When discussing the 
standard for step one—which triggers the presumption—the Ninth Circuit ref-
erences Footnote Six, which pronounces: 
Some of our cases have suggested the presumption attaches under only more 
limited circumstances. For example, in United States v. Dutkel, we said in dic-
tum that the presumption of prejudice arises only in the context of jury tamper-
ing (i.e., threats or bribes intended to influence the jury’s decision). Although 
tampering is among the types of contacts that may raise a presumption, nothing 
in Mattox or Remmer suggests this is the only circumstance where the presump-
tion arises. We have also suggested that the presumption applies only to the in-
troduction of extraneous information—not to ex parte contacts that do not impart 
information “pertaining to any fact in controversy or any law applicable to the 
case.” Although, as noted, it is certainly relevant whether the contact was “about 
the matter pending before the jury,” neither Remmer nor Mattox suggests that 
the outside party must actually “submit extraneous information (e.g., a file or 
dictionary) to the jury” before the presumption arises. In Tarango, for example, 
the police officers who tailed the holdout juror on his drive into the courthouse 
imparted no specific information about any fact or point of law in the case. This 
contact was nonetheless “possibly prejudicial” within the meaning of Mattox 
and Remmer. Accordingly, we reiterate that any outside contact raising a credi-
ble risk of influencing the verdict triggers the presumption of prejudice. To the 
extent cases such as Dutkel and Rosenthal suggested otherwise, they are disap-
proved.132 
While subtly worded, Footnote Six reveals two monumental shifts in Ninth 
Circuit jury misconduct jurisprudence: (1) the categories of prosaic contacts, ex 
parte contacts and extraneous information meld into a single spectrum, and (2) 
the standard for triggering the Remmer presumption is lowered to a “credible 
risk” of influencing the jury standard. 
Footnote Six glides through the three categories of contacts, connecting 
them into one spectrum. The footnote recognizes that past Ninth Circuit case 
law has been unclear about which categories of misconduct trigger the Remmer 
presumption. The footnote then combines the three categories by opining that 
“any outside contact” could “trigger[] the presumption of prejudice.”133 
At the conclusion of the footnote, the Ninth Circuit expressly disapproved 
portions of two Ninth Circuit cases, Dutkel and Rosenthal. The dicta in these 
cases marked for disapproval squarely addresses categorizing jury misconduct 
as a process for attaching the presumption. By disapproving Dutkel and Rosen-
thal, the Ninth Circuit signaled to lower courts that misconduct should no long-
                                                        
131  Id. at 959, 962–64. 
132  Id. at 968 n.6 (citations omitted) (alterations omitted). 
133  Id. 
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er be viewed categorically, but along a single spectrum with the dividing line 
being the point at which the presumption is triggered. 
The other major change is lowering the trigger standard for the Remmer 
presumption to a point where any outside contact has “credible risk” of influ-
encing the verdict.134 Interestingly, this standard seemingly comes out of no-
where. The Circuit cited Tarango for the credible risk standard,135 but Tarango 
did not pronounce a new standard or provide a citation to support its “credible 
risk” language.136 This dicta in Tarango is gloss on statements made in Mattox 
about an external contact having a “tendency” to be “injurious to the defend-
ant.”137 Mattox, in turn, when commenting that “[i]t is not open to reasonable 
doubt that the tendency of” the newspaper article at issue in the case “was inju-
rious to the defendant,”138 was merely stating the obvious. After all, the news-
paper article stated, inter alia, “[i]f [Mattox] is not found guilty of murder he 
will be a lucky man, for the evidence against him was very strong, or, at least, 
appeared to be to an outsider.”139 This language should be considered a super-
fluous comment about the obvious nature of the newspaper’s prejudice to Mat-
tox. Godoy therefore created a new standard for attaching the Remmer pre-
sumption based on a Ninth Circuit panel’s gloss on 125-year-old dicta. 
After Godoy, any outside contact with the jury, be it a prosaic contact, jury 
tampering, or extraneous information, should be evaluated under a two-step 
framework similar to the prosaic/jury-tampering framework. The first step is 
determining whether the defendant presents “evidence of a contact sufficiently 
improper as to raise a credible risk of affecting the outcome of the case.”140 De-
fendants will have the burden of proving something more than “threadbare or 
speculative allegations” of misconduct or “prosaic” contacts with the jury.141 
Courts should continue to consider the content of the allegations, seriousness of 
the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source. In these con-
siderations, the identity of the outside party and nature of the contact are partic-
ularly relevant.142 Undue contact between government officials, like bailiffs or 
law enforcement agents involved in the case, and jurors “will almost categori-
cally trigger the presumption.”143 
                                                        
134  Id. at 967–68, 968 n.6. 
135  Id. at 967. 
136  See generally Tarango v. McDaniel, 815 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2016). 
137  Id. at 1222 (citation omitted) (“Mattox requires a trial court to examine possible prejudice 
when it is confronted with evidence of an external contact that has a ‘tendency’ to be ‘injuri-
ous to the defendant.’ Thus, an external contact with a juror need only raise a risk of influ-
encing the verdict to be deemed possibly prejudicial.”). 
138  Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892). 
139  Id. at 143. 
140  Godoy, 861 F.3d at 967. 
141  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). 
142  Id. 
143  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In sum, at step one, trial courts should evaluate the full context of the alle-
gations and determine whether the contact was improper and whether the con-
tact raises a credible risk of influencing the jury. If the contact was proper or 
does not have a credible risk of influencing the jury, then the inquiry ceases. 
Conversely, if the contact was improper and raises a credible risk of influenc-
ing the jury, then the court continues to step two. 
At step two, “the presumption of prejudice attaches, and the burden shifts 
to the [government] to prove the contact was harmless.”144 “Harmlessness in 
this context means that there is no reasonable possibility that the communica-
tion influenced the verdict.”145 Accordingly, the reasonable possibility standard 
survives Godoy, but there is no question that the burden of proof and persua-
sion lies squarely with the prosecution. Trial courts should still consider em-
ploying the Dickson/Jeffries factors to evaluate whether the government has 
reached its burden. 
As for jury voir dire and the Remmer hearing, Godoy mandates that “once 
the presumption attaches, the trial court must hold a hearing on prejudice if 
there is any remaining uncertainty about what actually transpired, or whether 
the incidents that may have occurred were harmful or harmless.”146 The form of 
the hearing will depend on “what is necessary to determine the circumstances 
of the contact, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was 
prejudicial,” but the investigation be must be “reasonably calculated to resolve 
the doubts raised about the juror’s impartiality.”147 
If Footnote Six is a sea change in Ninth Circuit law, then the question be-
comes, why a footnote? One possibility is the nature of the case. In habeas pro-
ceedings, in order to hear a claim de novo, a reasoned decision of the last state 
court to hear the matter must be contrary to clearly established Supreme Court 
law.148 Pronouncing major shifts in jurisprudence is contradictory to finding 
that Supreme Court law is clearly established and there would be no reversal 
without de novo review. 
Still a second reason could be that the Circuit was refraining from ac-
knowledging just how confusing jury misconduct jurisprudence has become. 
After all, the trial court’s error in relying on a single statement to simultaneous-
ly raise and rebut a presumption was obvious, as “a ‘presumption’ can be rebut-
ted only by contrary evidence.”149 Yet, the en banc Ninth Circuit was the first 
tribunal to recognize the necessity of a Remmer hearing.150 
                                                        
144  Id. at 968 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). 
146  Id. at 969 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). 
148  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
149  Godoy, 861 F.3d at 965. 
150  See id. at 969–70 (illustrating the tension in the jurisprudence, which disapproves of a 
portion of Rosenthal in fashioning the new framework and then relies on Rosenthal in apply-
ing said framework). 
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A third possibility is that the Ninth Circuit did not wish to acknowledge, or 
wade into, a deep and continually fracturing circuit split that is difficult to de-
fine. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith v. Phillips151 and United States v. 
Olano152 “created a great deal of uncertainty with respect to the continuing via-
bility of the Remmer presumption, leading to a split among the federal Circuit 
Courts nationally.”153 Phillips and Olano are not jury misconduct cases that 
should have led to a circuit split, but given the state of confusion over applying 
the Remmer presumption, it is unsurprising that these Supreme Court cases 
provided enough dicta to splinter the circuits on the Remmer presumption. 
Phillips was a habeas corpus appeal from a petitioner convicted of two 
counts of murder and one count of attempted murder.154 The juror misconduct 
stemmed from a juror’s job application during trial for employment as a major 
felony investigator with the same prosecutor’s office that was prosecuting the 
petitioner.155 Shortly after conviction, the trial court held a hearing on the juror 
misconduct and denied a request for a new trial.156 The trial court’s denial of 
the petition was affirmed on direct appeal.157 On collateral review, the federal 
district court granted the habeas petition and the Second Circuit affirmed.158 
The Supreme Court reversed finding that the state trial court’s hearing was con-
stitutionally sufficient.159 Using Remmer I as an example, but without directly 
citing to the decision, the Supreme Court stated: “This Court has long held that 
the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant 
has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”160 
In Olano, at the close of a complex criminal fraud trial, alternate jurors 
were allowed to attend deliberations without objection from defense counsel.161 
After conviction, the Ninth Circuit reversed under a plain error standard finding 
that the alternate jurors’ presence violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
24(c), which controls impaneling and discharge of alternate jurors.162 In a foot-
note, the Circuit briefly glossed over the plain error standard merely stating that 
“the violation is inherently prejudicial” and that “it infringes upon a substantial 
                                                        
151  See generally Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 
152  See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
153  State v. Berrios, 129 A.3d 696, 706 (Conn. 2016); see also United States v. Lawson, 677 
F.3d 629, 642 (4th Cir. 2012) (“While the Supreme Court has not departed explicitly from its 
holding in Remmer, there is a split among the circuits regarding the issue whether the Rem-
mer presumption has survived intact following certain later Court decisions.”). 
154  Smith, 455 U.S. at 210–11. 
155  Id. at 212. 
156  Id. at 213–14. 
157  Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
158  Smith, 455 U.S. at 214. 
159  Id. at 221. 
160  Id. at 215. 
161  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 727–29 (1993). 
162  Id. at 730. 
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right of the defendants.”163 The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to clarify the 
standard for ‘plain error’ review by the courts of appeals under [Federal] Rule 
[of Criminal Procedure] 52(b).”164 Evaluating the juror “intrusion” jurispru-
dence within the plain error rubric, the Olano Court summarized heavily from 
Phillips and then citing Turner recognized that “[t]here may be cases where an 
intrusion should be presumed prejudicial, . . . but a presumption of prejudice as 
opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the in-
trusion affect the jury’s deliberations and thereby its verdict?”165 The Supreme 
Court went on to narrow the holding stating, “Of course, the issue here is 
whether the alternates’ presence sufficed to establish remedial authority under 
Rule 52(b), not whether it violated the Sixth Amendment or Due Process 
Clause . . .” so the question “is whether the instant violation of Rule 24(c) prej-
udiced respondents, either specifically or presumptively.”166 The Supreme 
Court was “not persuaded that the instant violation of Rule 24(c) was actually 
prejudicial.”167 And because there was there was “no specific showing that the 
alternate jurors . . . either participated in the jury’s deliberations or ‘chilled’ de-
liberation by the regular jurors,” and the defendants never requested a hearing, 
the issue could be decided against the defendants without a “Remmer-like hear-
ing.”168 
Phillips and Olano are jury misconduct outliers and should never have 
shattered the circuits. The misconduct in each case falls squarely outside the 
contact and extraneous information spectrum. The juror in Phillips who applied 
for a job with the prosecutor’s office while serving as a juror was internally bi-
ased as opposed to externally influenced by some contact or extraneous infor-
mation. In Olano, the intrusion came from the mere presence of alternate ju-
rors, not from some extra-judicial source. Moreover, the intrusion’s extent was 
never hashed out because there was no hearing in the trial court. The cases are 
also set apart in their standards of appellate review in that Phillips was a habeas 
case that accorded special deference to the state courts and Olano was decided 
within the stricture of plain error review. Indeed, Olano has become the semi-
nal decision for plain error review.169 Both decisions were penned by conserva-
tive jurists, Phillips by then Justice William Rehnquist, and Olano by Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, who took umbrage with broad applications of presump-
tive or conclusive implied juror bias.170 Finally, Phillips and Olano involved 
                                                        
163  Id. at 731. 
164  Id. 
165  Id. at 739 (citation omitted). 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 740. 
168  Id. at 739–40. 
169  Virgin Islands v. Vanterpool, 767 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2014) (describing Olano as 
“seminal.”); United States v. Roberson, 46 M.J. 826, 828 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (recog-
nizing Olano as the “seminal case explaining the doctrine of plain error.”). 
170  Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221–22 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (writing sepa-
rately to express her view that Phillips “does not foreclose the use of ‘implied bias’ ” in 
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extraordinarily lengthy criminal trial proceedings involving serious crimes, 
double homicide in Phillips,171 and a seven-defendant elaborate loan kickback 
scheme in Olano,172 that the conservative members of the Supreme Court were 
presumably not readily willing to disturb.173 Without expressly stating so, the 
majority in each case may have weighed the policies of reserving judicial re-
sources and finality against the severity of the jury misconduct. 
Courts and scholars have recognized the circuit split, yet there is wide dis-
agreement about the split’s nature. The Fourth Circuit recognizes a three-way 
circuit split with the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits applying the Remmer presumption “in cases involving external influences 
on jurors,” the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits “de-
part[ing] from use of the presumption,” and the First and Third Circuits condi-
tionally apply the Remmer presumption in egregious cases.174 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Connecticut opines that the Se-
cond Circuit applies the presumption to cases where “any extra-record infor-
mation” has been imparted to a juror, the Fourth Circuit triggers the presump-
tion where the “extrajudicial communication” is “more than innocuous,” the 
First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits apply the presumption 
to “serious, or not ‘innocuous’ claims of external influence,” the Eleventh Cir-
cuit continues to apply Remmer “while acknowledging, but declining to re-
solve, questions concerning its continued viability,” the Fifth and District of 
Columbia Circuits “significantly modified or overruled” the Remmer presump-
tion, and the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the Remmer presumption is “a 
completely dead letter.”175 
Outside of the courts, one writer describes the circuit split as the Eleventh 
Circuit having “no articulated standard,” the Seventh and Fourth Circuits ap-
                                                                                                                                 
“some extreme situations” such as when a “juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting 
agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal 
transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transac-
tion.”); see also McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 552–56 (1984) (re-
versing a finding of implied juror bias where the juror failed to disclose material information 
in voir dire and setting forth a new standard that removes implying juror bias from the analy-
sis). 
171  Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
172  Olano, 507 U.S. at 727. 
173  The first trial in Phillips lasted forty-two days and ended in a mistrial, and the second 
trial lasted sixty-six days. 485 F. Supp. at 1366–67. The trial in Olano lasted three months. 
507 U.S. at 727. In another juror misconduct case, Justice Rehnquist explained that “a liti-
gant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials,” and that 
“[t]rials are costly, not only for the parties, but also for the jurors performing their civic duty 
and for society which pays the judges and support personnel who manage the trials.” Green-
wood, 464 U.S. at 553 (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). The jurist 
then noted that “We have also come a long way from the time when all trial error was pre-
sumed prejudicial and reviewing courts were considered citadels of technicality.” Id. (cita-
tion omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
174  United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2012). 
175  State v. Berrios, 129 A.3d 696, 707, 709–10, 710 n.21 (Conn. 2016). 
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plying the presumption with “an exception for innocuous interventions,” the 
Tenth and Eighth Circuits using the presumption but having a carve out for 
federal habeas cases, “[t]he Second and Third Circuits applying a variation of 
the hypothetical-average-jury test,” the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits 
granting discretion to the trial court as to whether to apply the presumption or 
not, the First and Ninth Circuits applying the presumption only in “egregious 
circumstances,” and the Sixth Circuit having discarded the presumption.176 
The dizzying array of views on circuit approaches and alignments is the 
product of decades of categorizing conduct that is best viewed on a spectrum. 
While the Ninth Circuit chose not to opine on the circuit split or recognize its 
application of the Remmer presumption as an issue of first impression, the 
Fourth Circuit addressed the split head-on and stated that “the question whether 
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises in” extraneous information cases 
“is an issue of first impression in this Court.”177 While there are many ways to 
parse the circuit split, only three circuits have expressly applied a defined 
Remmer presumption to extraneous information cases: the Fourth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits. That is where these circuits split off from the rest. 
In sum, the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have chosen to pare down 
the Remmer presumption framework and apply that framework to extraneous 
information cases. This framework turns the categories of misconduct into a 
single spectrum. By doing so, the framework is designed for handling the un-
told variations of misconduct in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
While federal appellate courts traditionally shy away from sweeping 
changes in constitutional law, the digital age is quite the opposite. The law sus-
tains on stability while the digital age feasts on disruption. Every day across the 
nation jurors are called upon to disrupt their lives to fulfill their civic duty. Cit-
izens do not stop being their digitally connected selves when they become ju-
rors, and so it is poetic that the jury box is where technology exerts the greatest 
potential to disrupt trials. As new conduits of communication carry ever in-
creasing depths of content to jurors, trial courts should expect jury misconduct 
to skyrocket. No matter how novel the misconduct, the Ninth Circuit’s Godoy 
framework is the blueprint for jury misconduct in the digital age. 
                                                        
176  Kerr, supra note 19, at 1463–76 (alteration omitted). 
177  Lawson, 677 F.3d at 644. 
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